Dioxin Struggle in Nose Township, Japan

1 Japan's Incineration Policy and Dioxin Contamination
According to the UNEP, Japan generated almost 40% of the world's emissions of
dioxin by waste incineration in 95 (see chart 1). The waste treatment policy
heavily depends upon incineration rather than source reduction, reuse, and
recycling.
In 97, the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) finally tightened the
regulations to control dioxin emissions (see the attached History of Nose
Dioxin). Due to this new guideline, MOHW report says the total amount of
dioxin emission has been reduced by 54% from 5,945~5,965g in 97 to
2,625~2,645 g in 98.
However, the burning-first policy has not yet changed. The new policy
direction is so -called high technology incineration. We are afraid this
policy enhances the risk of chemical contamination while discouraging
industry from reducing hazardous wastes and use of chemicals.
On the other hand, many hidden, latent contamination sites have been recently
uncovered here and there in Japan due to the concerned citizens' movement and
the scientific investigations conducted by the Government or NPOs.
Nose's (pronounced as [no-say]) dioxin contamination is the worst soil
pollution accumulated by an incineration facility through the past 9 years of
operation, when Japanese government continuously ignored the warnings of
dioxin related risks by scientists and citizens.

２　Overview of Nose's Incineration Facility and the Cause of Contamination
Nose Township is located in the suburbs of Osaka with the population of
15,000. The adjacent town is Toyono Township which has 27,000 population.
Younger residents commuting to Osaka gradually moved in the area but still
the traditional farming is the main industry of Nose.
Nose and Toyono jointly constructed Toyono Clean Center (TCC) in 1988. It has
two incinerators with the capacity of 53 tons per 16 hours of semi-continuous
operation. The system's chart is attached to this report. TCC entered into an
accord with the local residents and promised that it would not cause any
pollution including dioxin. The maker and the actual operator of the
incinerators were Mitsui Shipbuilding Co. Ltd., and its subsidiary (Mitsui).
TCC began its operation in 1988. When MOHW issued the former guideline for
dioxin control in 1990, TCC and Mitsui knew the facility did not comply with
the guideline. They discussed the renovation plan but decided to continue the
operation as before, while the Government did little to seriously enforce the
guideline.
Given the domestic and international pressures, however, the MOHW finally
introduced tougher dioxin control measures in 97. Mitsui and TCC conducted
several tests and hid the data, knowing that the dioxin emission data were by
far beyond the maximum limit of the new regulation. When the data were later
disclosed, they were forced to suspend the operation of TCC.
In order to soothe the anger of local residents, TCC decided to conduct a
soil test near the facility. Contrary to their assumption, the test revealed
serious dioxin contamination, which led to series of special investigations
around and inside the facility. The results of the tests are seen in the
attached contamination area map.
The most dioxin-contaminated area around the facility was just below the
cooling tower located at the top of the facility building; 52,000ng-TEQ/g.
The contamination mostly tends to concentrate within 100m from the facility.
Extraordinarily high contamination was found in the circulating water in the
gas cleaning tower; 3,000,0000 ng-TEQ/l.
In June 1999, the expert committee at the MOHW concluded the estimated cause
of the dioxin contamination as follows:

(1) Generation of dioxins by imperfect combustion
The combustion temperature was often below 800℃ and imperfect combustion is
estimated to have caused the generation of dioxins.
(2) Generation of dioxins in the process of off gas treatment
The temperature of the entrance of EP (dust filter) was kept around 320℃
~330℃ and this is estimated to have caused de novo generation of dioxin.
(3) Concentration of dioxins into the circulating water in the gas
cleaning tower
The system had a gas cleaning tower to remove HCL from the gas. The dioxin
generated at the incinerators and the EP mixed into the water used for
cleaning the off gas and highly concentrated while circulating the gas
cleaning system.
(4) Spread from the air cooling tower on the roof of the building
The circulating water was cooled at the air cooling tower set on the roof of
the building. The mist containing high density of dioxin spread and dropped
on the ground near the facility.

The report also mentioned the estimated total amount of dioxin emissions at
the facility from 1988 to 1997 as follows:
　
Emission from the smokestack: 114g
Emission from the mist of the cooling tower: 110g
Dioxin remained in the soil (-5cm to 0cm) within 1km radius: 40g

3 　Health Threat to Workers
146 workers were identified to have engaged in the incineration related works
at the facility and the Ministry of Labor (MOL) conducted a health check of
96 workers. The result of the test was quite shocking to the workers as well
as residents. The highest blood level dioxin was 805.8 pg-TEQ/g-fat. It was
the data of a worker who engaged in cleaning up of the gas cleaning tower and
the cooling tower. 12 samples show more than 100pg-TEQ/g-fat of dioxin in the
blood (see the attached data of 4 workers).
Even though some data indicate that there might be a possibility of adverse
effect on their immune system, the report of MOL concludes there is no
co-relation between the high concentration of dioxin and their present
conditions.
In July 2000, MOL suddenly announced that the blood test of 35 workers who
engaged in cleaning up and demolition operation of the polluted facility for
the past 9 months showed surprisingly high level of dioxin as follows (see
the attached data for detail) :

Max: 5,360.6 pg-TEQ/g-fat
Average: 680.5 pg-TEQ/g-fat
Min: 52.4pg-TEQ/g-fat

The workers were supposed to have been completely protected by masks, special
clothes, air shower, and other protective measures. MOL is now conducting an
emergency investigation to identify the cause of this secondary exposure.

４　People's Movement in Nose and Toyono
The first small victory was the revelation of the manipulation of emission
data and its concealment at TCC. Yagi and other local residents contributed
to this by filing an independent audit request and freedom of information
requests. TCC was forced to conduct a soil investigation in order to carry
out its renovation plan and this test resulted in the finding of serious
dioxin contamination.
In September 1998, 864 residents in Nose and Toyono filed an Environmental
Mediation against the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Osaka Prefectural
Government, the municipal governments of Nose and Toyono, TCC, and Mitsui
Shipbuilding and its subsidiary. This procedure is one of the ADRs and three
expert mediators appointed by the prefectural government proceed the
mediation. The final number of citizen participants in the mediation rose up
to 1155. The remedies requested by applicants included removal of
contaminated soils and other remains, the suspension of TCC, health checks of
local residents and workers, additional environmental investigations,
disclosure of relevant information, and payment of cost and compensation by
polluters.
After 27 hearings and meetings, the Mediation Committee proposed an
settlement draft in June 2000, and applicants and respondants including Nose,
Toyono, TCC, and Mitsui accepted the accord in July 2000.
The key clauses of the accord include the following provisions:
(1) Nose, Toyono, TCC shall safely remove and treat highly contaminated
soil and other remains by 2006;
(2) Nose, Toyono, and TCC shall conduct monitoring tests of surrounding
environment and health tests of local residents for 20 years;
(3) Nose, Toyono, and TCC shall supply local communities certain services
and support to revive the communities, including providing free bottled water
and constructing a safe play park for children;
(4) Local residents, Nose, Toyono, and TCC shall jointly establish a new
board to democratically discuss the dioxin countermeasures;
(5) Mitsui shall pay totally 750 million yen (approximately 7 million
dollars) to cover the cost for Nose, Toyono and local communities; and
(6) Nose and Toyono shall endeavor to reduce its municipal waste by 50 %
in 5 years.

Taking into account the fact that the total amount of cleaning up the site is
estimated to be more than 5 billion yen, Mitsui's share is not necessarily
enough. Due to the lack of super-fund like law and the historical negligence
of central government for dioxin control, the residents could not win 100% of
the remedies they requested. However, this is the first major victory to
clean up the dioxin contamination by an incineration facility in Japan and it
sets a relatively high standard as precedence.
One of the difficult issues left for open discussion is the choice of the
site and the technology for the treatment of the contaminated materials. TCC
wants to employ the geo-melt technology on site but the local public opinion
is severely divided.

５　Fights Still Going on
Compared to the cleaning up of the site, the measures for workers who burden
high health risks have been neglected. As mentioned above, they are regarded
as safe for the time being, and the MOL provides free health check once a
year. That is the all measures taken for the workers.
Mitsuo Takeoka suffers colon cancer, rectal cancer and lung cancer after
working at the facility for 8 years. Katsuo Hatanaka has chloracne-like skin
disease. Both applied for workers compensation in 99 but the claim was
dismissed this spring on the basis that their exposure of 2-3-7-8 TCDD is
relatively low. The kinds of dioxins they were exposed to and they
accumulated in their body are mostly furans. MOL relies upon scientific data
of 2-3-7-8 TCDD cases only and surprisingly ignored or underestimated the
risk of furans.
Together with other 4 workers, they filed a 530 million yen lawsuit against
MOHW, MOL, Osaka prefectural government, Nose, Toyono, and Mitsui and its
subsidiary. The main issues include:

(1) foreseeability of the risk of dioxin and the risk of incineration by
MOHW;
(2) foreseeability of the risk of incineration workers by MOL;
(3) whether Takaoka and Hatanaka have any symptoms related to dioxin;
(4) nexus between the symptoms and dioxin exposure;
(5) whether the incinerators made by Mitsui was defective;
(6) whether Mitsui's operation of the incinerators is negligent; and
(7) What is the damage? Can enhanced risk of health be deemed as damage?
Can monitoring cost of their health be regarded as damage?

In July 2000, a new network called "Nose Dioxin Lawsuit Supporting Network"
was established by environmental or labor organizations, activists, workers,
and a consumer organization in Osaka. While directly supporting the fight by
Nose's incineration workers, its ultimate goal is to change the dioxin policy
by Japanese government.
We would like to develop an international network through our activities and
call for a new international cooperation for the common cause.